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Abstract This article argues that geoeconomics, defined as the geostrategic use of
economic power, has become an increasingly important feature of regional powers’
strategic behavior. Yet, we still lack analytical tools to identify and compare regional
powers’ geoeconomic strategies. The article marks a first attempt to develop a typology
for differentiating potential geoeconomic strategies that regional powers may pursue in
dealing with their corresponding regions. It merges the regional power focus with a
geoeconomic perspective, producing the following four ideal-typical strategies: neo-
imperialism, neo-mercantilism, hegemony, and liberal institutionalism. This new typol-
ogy serves as a conceptual device for creating analytical differentiation between
regional powers and the range of possible geoeconomic strategies pursued by them.
The paper discusses ways in which the new typology may contribute to our under-
standing of regional powers’ foreign policy conduct and to the emerging geoeconomic
research agenda. While the purpose of the article is not to test any specific hypothesis or
to empirically analyze cases, brief case study vignettes will be presented for illustrative
purposes, looking particularly at Brazil, the EU, Germany, and Russia.
Introduction
International relations are increasingly shaped by two important and in many ways
intertwined developments. Firstly, the resurgence of regional powerhood (see Prys
2012) has been a dominant feature of the post-Cold War era. Regional powers—both
Bnew^ and Bold^—such as Brazil, Germany, China, India, Japan, Russia, and South
Africa, are defining regional relations to an ever greater extent, and in many instances,
they have also come to wield more influence at the global level. Secondly, geoeco-
nomics has arguably become an increasingly important aspect of contemporary
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international relations. The post-Cold War era is characterized not so much by political
or ideological rivalry but by economic competition. With the partial exception of
Russia, it is also economic—not military—capabilities that underpin the resurgence
of regional powers. Indeed, these regional actors are foremost economic powers and the
use of this economic power constitutes their most important strategic asset. How they
use it is of major importance for their corresponding regional orders and, by extension,
for the international order.
Yet, we still lack analytical instruments to identify and compare regional
powers’ geoeconomic strategies. Extant theories often assume monolithic
behavior by regional powers (e.g., Mearsheimer 2001; for a discussion, see
also Destradi 2010; Prys 2010). However, even a superficial comparison
between, for instance, Germany and Russia, in the way they project power
in their neighborhood shows two divergent strategies at work. Regional
powers are not monolithic in their strategic outlook; therefore, we need
analytical tools that can better identify empirical variation between them and
lay the ground for a comparative analysis of regional power strategies. Some
scholars have begun to develop such tools, constructing typologies for differ-
entiating ideal-typical strategies that regional powers might pursue in dealing
with their neighbors in the region (Destradi 2010; Prys 2010). But no such
attempt has yet been made for the geoeconomic strategies of regional powers.
Herein lies a gap in the literature. If, indeed, the role of geoeconomics has
emerged to rival geopolitics in the strategic thinking of regional powers, as
some observers claim, developing better analytical tools for understanding
geoeconomic power and its use is imperative.
This article seeks to contribute to this debate by suggesting an ideal-typical
taxonomy of potential geoeconomic strategies that regional powers may pursue
in dealing with their corresponding regions. It merges the regional power focus
with a geoeconomic perspective, producing the following four ideal-typical
strategies: neo-imperialism, neo-mercantilism, hegemony, and liberal institution-
alism. This new typology serves as a device for creating analytic differentiation
between regional powers and the range of possible geoeconomic strategies
pursued by them. Such a typology is an important starting point for further
theoretical and empirical work. The purpose of this article is therefore not to
test any specific hypothesis or to empirically analyze cases, although brief
references will be made to illustrative cases. What this article does is merely
to develop a conceptual scheme that can be used in subsequent empirical and
theoretical research to analyze regional powers’ strategies. Importantly, it is the
first such attempt from a geoeconomic perspective.
This article first discusses geoeconomics as an analytical perspective. It argues that
geoeconomics forms an important part of regional powers’ strategic behavior. It then
reviews different conceptualizations of geoeconomics and argues for choosing an
eclectic approach, whereby these different conceptualizations can be used to create
analytic differentiation. Making use of such an approach, the third section creates a
typology for differentiating regional powers’ geoeconomic strategies. Here, brief case
study vignettes will also be presented looking particularly at Brazil, the EU, Germany,
and Russia. All four are geoeconomically powerful actors in their corresponding
regions. Yet, they clearly employ diametrically different geoeconomic strategies and,
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therefore, serve as ideal-typical illustrative cases.1 The paper concludes by discussing
ways in which the new typology may contribute to our understanding of regional power
foreign policy conduct and to the emerging geoeconomic research agenda.
Regional powers and geoeconomics: an eclectic approach
As an analytic perspective, geoeconomics usually starts from the premise of the relative
decline of military concerns and the rise of economic concerns in relations between
states (e.g., Luttwak 1990; Szabo 2015; Zarate 2012). It emphasizes how states
primarily compete with each other for economic power. According to Huntington
(1993, p. 72), B…in a world in which military conflict between major states is unlikely,
economic power will be increasingly important in determining the primacy or subor-
dination of states.^ By merging geopolitics and economics, the geoeconomic perspec-
tive highlights how in the current international system, economic—rather than mili-
tary—leverage is more consequential in the pursuit of national interests.
The imperatives of geoeconomics are clearly discernable in the foreign policies of
regional powers (Baracuhy 2013; Hsiung 2009; Khandekar 2014; Tsygankov 2005;
Szabo 2015; see also Hurrell 2006). Regional powers usually apply economic rather
than military means when pursuing strategic objectives on the international stage. Not
only do they seldom possess the necessary military power to pursue their foreign policy
goals through the use of force but also the security challenges that they now encounter
also tend to be of an economic nature and therefore less amenable to military solutions
(e.g., Brattberg and Hamilton 2014; Mudiam 2007; Wright 2013). While not displacing
military security concerns, economic security has thus been elevated on the scale of
strategic priorities to a country’s national interests (Hsiung 2009; Zarate 2012). As
regional powers aim to expand their markets, guarantee their supply lines, and secure
their access to finance and cutting-edge technologies, economic security has become a
vital component of regional powers’ ability to project their power and influence.
So, irrespective of the question whether geoeconomics has actually eclipsed geo-
politics as a strategic desideratum in the foreign policies of regional powers—a
question which this paper will not address—it seems clear that geoeconomic calcula-
tions form part of regional powers’ geostrategies. It thus becomes imperative to
systematically compare the geoeconomic strategies of regional powers, which calls
for developing better analytical tools. This requires a brief analysis of the concept of
geoeconomics itself and what possible variations exist in terms of strategic practice.
While no shared definition of the concept of geoeconomics has emerged, it can be
broadly understood to revolve around the geostrategic use of economic power.
Irrespective of their varying military capabilities, Brazil, Germany, China, India,
Japan, Russia, and South Africa are all major economic powers in their respective
regions, on which minor neighboring powers are more or less dependent.2 Typically,
they are the most important trading partners for several other countries within the
region, and some of them are clearly the geographic nodes of regional economic
1 This article does not attempt to explain why they employ different strategies, which may have to do with a
number of factors ranging from structural to institutional and cultural differences. Here, the purpose is
descriptive, using them as cases to illustrate how regional powers’ geoeconomic strategy may differ.
2 For a discussion of what constitutes Beconomic power,^ see Kappel (2011).
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networks (e.g., Chen and De Lombaerde 2014). They also control significant financial
assets that can be deployed beyond their borders. This economic and financial potential
provides them with asymmetric economic power that may be leveraged for national
advantage (Armijo et al. 2014; Wu and Koh 2014). Regional powers may threaten to
cut off smaller neighbors from trade and finance in an effort to coerce them. 3
Alternatively, they may use positive incentives to affect their behavior. Sometimes,
trade and investment ties are so important that they will almost automatically lead to the
creation of pro-regional power interest groups and constituencies in neighboring states
(Wright 2013). Among geoeconomic observers, there seems to be broad agreement that
the sort of asymmetric interdependence that regional economic systems often embody
provides regional powers with disproportionate leverage (Kappel 2011). Trading rela-
tionships, investment capital, overseas aid, and the leverage stemming from being able
to wield influence in global monetary or trade regimes all provide Brazil, Germany,
China, India, Japan, and Russia with economic power which they can use to affect the
behavior of others.4 Yet, observers differ in relation to the question as for what ends
economic power is strategically used (political versus economic) and through what sort
of strategic frame (competitive versus cooperative) it is employed.
To Luttwak, geoeconomics denoted Bthe pursuit of adversarial goals with commer-
cial means^ (Luttwak quoted in Cable 1995, p. 308) exposing the growing importance
of economic over military means in pursuing strategic ends. Such a realist conceptu-
alization of geoeconomics emphasizes how competition for relative power continues to
drive state behavior in international relations, albeit using economic as opposed to
military means (Luttwak 1990; see also Huntington 1993). Within this realist paradigm,
geoeconomics has strong links to geopolitics—economic foreign policy is deployed not
only to maximize the country’s socioeconomic wellbeing but also to fulfill broader
geostrategic goals. These may have to do with improving the country’s position in the
regional or international hierarchy; gaining prestige or, eventually, after having ac-
quired a sustainable economic basis; improve the country’s broader geopolitical poten-
tial. The emphasis is thus clearly on the pursuit of relative, political goals.
Yet, onemay also envisage amore liberal conceptualization of geoeconomics, in which
economic power is used and pursued as an end in itself and not necessarily through a
competitive strategic frame. Here, the strategic goals are more purely economic and may
be pursued, not as a zero-sum game with the goal of maximizing relative gains but in
cooperation with others in the pursuit of common goals (Grevi 2011). Contrary to realists,
who argue that states are naturally competitive, liberals take the option of cooperative
engagement between states far more seriously. Within such a liberal paradigm, the links to
geopolitics are weaker. Economic foreign policy is deployed primarily to ensure a
favorable external environment for developing the domestic economy.
There is no reason, a priori, to eschew either perspective, as both strategic uses of
economic power seem perfectly plausible. On the one hand, a country’s economic
potential and its external economic policy instruments may be used for exerting
political influence, with the aim of improving the country’s geopolitical status (i.e., a
3 According to McKeown (1983:77), BThere is…a much more potent and historically relevant weapon of
economic ‘power’ available to the hegemonic state: it can threaten to cut off one nation’s access to its rich
home market while allowing other nations continued access to that market.^
4 For a seminal analysis of trade as an instrument of foreign policy, see Hirschman (1980). See also McKeown
(1983) for a discussion of instruments of economic power.
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political end). On the other hand, economic power may also be used for purely
economic ends, to preserve or attain a privileged position for the country’s economy
in the international arena. In either case, economic power is leveraged for national
advantage. Whether it is leveraged aggressively as a unilateral act or using a more
multilateral approach by cooperatively engaging with other states depends on the
strategic frame of the country in question. With a strategic frame, I refer to the particular
beliefs, values, and ideas that shape a country’s geoeconomic strategy.5 Countries may
embody realist or more liberal strategic frames through which they conduct their
external economic policies. Any typology of regional powers’ geoeconomic strategies
should therefore incorporate both realist and liberal perspectives, keeping open the
possibility of both realist and liberal strategic uses of economic power in practice.
In fact, this sort of theoretical eclecticism serves as a way to create analytical
differentiation. By combining both realist and liberal conceptualizations of geoeco-
nomics, we can construct a typology that incorporates possible divergence in strategic
behavior without having to exclude any type of behavior ex ante by theoretical fiat.
Instead, it can be left open for empirical analysis what type of geoeconomic strategy a
certain regional power engages in and comparisons can be made between different
cases. Scholars have called for more eclectic international relation research, emphasiz-
ing Bthe virtues of an ‘eclectic combination’ of diverse theoretical perspectives in
making sense of cases, cautioning against the excessive ‘simplifications’ required to
apply a single theoretical lens to grasp the manifold complexities on the ground^ (Sil
and Katzenstein 2010, p. 412). The eclectic approach to typology building adopted here
seeks to bridge different paradigms and combine them so as to allow for a more diverse
and flexible framework of analysis.
Regional powers’ geoeconomic strategies: an ideal-typical taxonomy
Regional power geoeconomic strategy is here referred to as the use of economic
leverage by a preponderant regional actor to preserve and realize its interests in the
region.6 Such a definition does not a priori posit a certain type of strategic behavior to a
regional power. Instead, by assuming that regional actors have some degree of freedom
of choice with regard to devising strategies, the definition leaves it open to empirical
research to find out what type of strategy a certain regional power actually applies. A
regional power is therefore simply taken to mean an actor that displays preponderance
in relation to most other actors in a region in terms of power capabilities.7 No further
assumptions are made about their behavior, whether they exercise leadership or fulfill
any other roles in their regions. This contrasts with some recent studies on regional
5 For a discussion of Bframes,^ see Barnett (1999). For a broader discussion of strategic culture, see Johnston
(1995).
6 While regional powers may posess varying capabilities for global action so that some of them also can be
called Bglobal powers,^ the focus in this article is on their regional power roles. It may well be that their
varying global capabilities affect their chosen (regional) geoeconomic strategy, but that is a question for
empirical research and does not form part of the conceptual mission of this article.
7 While building on Destradi (2010) and Prys (2010), this definition does not foreclose the possibility of a
regional multipolarity, i.e., a situation in which more than one regional power exists within a certain region.
Britain, France, and Germany have historically often displayed preponderance to most other actors in Europe,
without anyone of them being able to exercise regional hegemony. It still makes sense calling them all regional
powers on the basis of their preponderant capacities for regional action in relation to other European actors.
Conceptualizing regional powers’ geoeconomic strategies:... 139
powers in which they are Bconceived of as states pursuing exclusively benevolent,
leading, integrating strategies^ (Destradi 2010, p. 907).8 For instance, Nolte (2010,
p. 893) conceptualizes regional powers as claimers of a Bleading^ role in the
region and constituting a long list of criteria ranging from the provision of
collective goods for the region to defining the regional security agenda and being
recognized as the leader by other states inside and outside of the region. However, the
problem with such an expanded definition of regional power is that it forecloses analysis
of issues that may be better to leave open for empirical research.
The model depicted in Fig. 1 develops an ideal-typical taxonomy of possible
geoeconomic strategies pursued by regional powers by distinguishing whether the
regional power (1) has a competitive or cooperative strategic frame and (2) treats
economic power as a means to other strategic aims or as a goal in itself.
As for (1), considering that regional powers have a preponderance of economic
power resources vis-à-vis neighboring countries, distinguishing competitive from co-
operative strategic frames include observing whether a regional power stands prepared
to act unilaterally also when it is clear that it may negatively affect minor neighboring
powers. When the goal is to perpetuate economic domination and the cementing of a
hierarchical relationship in which neighboring states are made more dependent on the
regional power, allowing it to reap national benefits at the expense of mutual benefits, it
seems clear that the strategic frame is competitive. Herein, coercive external economic
policies may be deployed, such as threatening to cut off market access, commodity
supply, or foreign aid in order to pressure a neighboring minor power to acquiesce to a
hierarchical, even exploitative, relationship that allows the regional power to write the
rules of the game. Alternatively, a regional power may be prepared to act for the
achievement of collective goals for a regional grouping, which would clearly indicate a
cooperative strategic frame. In this case, the conduct of a regional power may involve
acting as the Bpaymaster,^ by providing positive incentives for regional institutional-
ization and committing itself to the common norms and rules of such regional gover-
nance structures.
As for (2), it may not always be simple to determine whether economic power is
deployed as a means to achieve broader geopolitical aims, e.g., regional political
domination, or as a goal in itself, i.e., to accumulate wealth and well-being and reduce
economic vulnerability. When a regional power is prepared to invest considerable
economic resources in exchange for political influence and alliances, without any clear
prospect of gaining economic returns on this investment, economic power is clearly
deployed as a means to some other goal, be it to elevate its geopolitical status or cement
its leadership in the region, for instance. The way Venezuela under Chavez used its oil
rents to gain political influence in Latin America and engage in Bsoft balancing^ against
the USA is a case in point (Corrales 2009; Jácome 2011). Russia’s preparedness to act
as the paymaster for the Eurasian Economic Union, despite the economic benefits for
Russia itself being highly questionable, is also an indication of external economic
policy being subordinated to broader political goals (Roberts et al. 2014). So, although
the means are economic, the underlying motivations are political.
Alternatively, when a regional power is clearly not prepared to assume the costs of
regional leadership, but rather uses its economic power to further its own commercial
8 For a review of these studies, see Destradi (2010), Prys (2010), and Nolte (2010).
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interests, it indicates that the driving motivations are narrowly economic rather than
more broadly political. For instance, Brazil has often been seen as unwilling to invest in
regional leadership. Often characterized as a Bgeopolitically satisfied country,^ Brazil
has defined its national interests in economic terms, with national economic develop-
ment therefore being a far more important foreign policy goal than assuming political
leadership in the region (Malamud and Rodriquez 2014; Soares de Lima and Hirst
2006). Britain has already for decades pursued a regional policy of promoting its
commercial interests in Europe, while showing little interest in broader regional
leadership. Its motivations for engaging in EU integration have been economic, and
for that end, it has been using its economic leverage within Europe, trying to promote a
more economically liberal outlook for the EU, in accordance with Britain’s national
trade and investment interests (Wall 2008; see also Mayer 2010). Politically, its strategy
has more often been one of Bescaping the region,^ so as to eschew any costs involved
with regional political activism. As such a Bdetached regional power^ Britain does not
actively nourish any broader regional political project but uses its economic power
foremost to further its own economic interests in the region.
By combining (1) and (2), Fig. 1 constructs a matrix with the following four ideal-
typical geoeconomic strategies: neo-imperialism, neo-mercantilism, hegemony, and
liberal institutionalism. Both neo-mercantilist and neo-imperialist strategies stem from
a competitive strategic frame in which foreign relations are treated as a zero-sum game
in which one side’s gain is another’s relative loss. Both strategies may deploy economic
power as aggressive leverage to extract concessions and pressure neighboring countries
in a unilateral pursuit of national interest. Yet, they differ as to whether such economic
power is seen as a means to pursue other strategic objectives or as a goal in itself above
other strategic objectives. In contrast, liberal institutionalist and hegemony strategies
are pursued by regional powers with an essentially cooperative strategic frame, in
which the role of mutual gains and benefits in interactions with neighboring countries
are highlighted. Both strategies refrain from coercion, which is seen as detrimental to
the long-term interests of the regional power. The focus is instead on the commonality
of gains and the reciprocal flow of benefits, whereby the regional power may also take
upon itself the role of the provider of public goods to solve or circumvent the collective
Strategic frame
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Fig. 1 Regional powers’ geoeconomic strategies
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action problems that may plague the efforts of parties seeking to reap joint gains. Yet,
they differ as to whether such economic power is deployed for purely economic ends or
merely as means to broader political hegemonic aspirations. A closer look at these
strategies together with short glances at some examples of these strategies will help
clarify their differences.
Neo-imperialist geoeconomic strategies are essentially deployed by regional
powers not only as a way to pursue economic objectives but also to create an
Binformal^ empire in the neighborhood. In contrast to traditional geopolitical
strategies, it is not so much concerned with enlarging its territorial control, as
with pursuing various forms of economic control, shaping the regional economic
structure in such a way that makes weaker states dependent on the regional power.
The means employed are economic, but the goal is geopolitical—creating neo-
imperial relations with weaker neighbors and thus substantially limiting their
sovereignty in relation to the regional power’s interests. As against the notion of
Bhegemony,^ the means employed in the exercise of power in the case of neo-
imperialism involves economic force, coercion, imposition, and bribery. 9
Economic force refers to the use of sanctions such as trade embargoes and
financial blockades intended to inflict real economic pain and make weaker states
acquiesce with the preferences of the regional power. Economic coercion implies
making a conditional threat of using such sanctions, altering the calculus of the
weaker state and pressuring it to comply. Economic imposition takes place when
the asymmetry is so great that the weaker state’s position is that of a vassal on
which the regional power does not need to use either force or coercion to make the
weaker state acquiesce. Bribery refers to prepaid rewards to both private and state
actors in neighboring countries in order to make them acquiescent and inflict
dependencies.10
The way Russia under President Vladimir Putin’s reign has conducted its external
economic policy would seem to point towards a neo-imperialist strategy par excellence.
A central element of this strategy has been the geostrategic use of Russia’s energy
capacities. These have been seen by Russian policymakers, starting with President
Putin himself, as a potent economic means to strengthen Russia’s geopolitical position
(Cohen 2009; Liuhto 2010; Stulberg 2005). Making neighboring countries dependent
on Russia’s energy supply and markets has been an important foreign policy goal.
While Russia has shown its preparedness to provide certain public goods through the
Eurasian Economic Union,11 it has hardly escaped anybody in the region that Russia’s
geoeconomic strategy also involves using coercion and bribery if necessary. Russia has
on many occasions threatened to cut energy supplies to neighboring countries and also
9 One may recall the distinction between dominance (i.e., imperialism) and hegemony developed by Hedley
Bull (quoted in Hurrell 2013, pp. 55–56): BDominance is characterized by the habitual use of force by a great
power against the lesser states comprising its hinterland and by habitual disregard of the universal norms of
interstate behavior that confer rights of sovereignty, equality, and independence upon these states…where a
great power exercises hegemony over the lesser powers in a particular area of constellation there is a resort to
force, but this is not habitual and uninhibited but occasional and reluctant. The great power prefers to rely upon
instruments other than the direct use or threat of force and will employ the latter only in situations of extremity
and with a sense that in doing so, it is incurring a political cost.^
10 For a related discussion, see Knorr (1977).
11 Russia has provided financial assistance to the smaller members of the EEU to help them restructure their
economies (Roberts et al. 2014).
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used this energy weapon against countries such as Ukraine. It has threatened to cut
access to the Russian market for products from neighboring countries such as Moldova
in an effort to coerce them to join the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union instead of
the EU’s Eastern Partnership (Paul 2013). There are also strong indications of Russia
using bribery, especially in Ukraine, to make policymakers in neighboring countries
acquiescent to the preferences of Russian economic interests (see, e.g., Grey et al.
2014). The Eurasian Economic Union project, as already mentioned above, is also seen
by many analysts as an attempt by Russia to further its broader geostrategic goals by
means of external economic policy (Roberts et al. 2014). Russia’s strategic use of its
economic power thus clearly aims towards broader political goals, rather than just to
promote its national commercial interests. The strategic frame of Russian policymakers
is also clearly competitive rather than cooperative, emphasizing relative as against
absolute gains.
Neo-mercantilist geoeconomic strategies are not foremost deployed to pursue
some immediate geopolitical project but to pursue economic power objectives as
such. They denote an economy-oriented notion of foreign policy realism that
understands the global political economy in terms of a zero-sum competition for
the control of markets, technology, and resources. Neo-mercantilist geoeconomic
powers are essentially Btrading states^ (Rosecrance 1986) that define their national
interest foremost in economic terms, while applying multilateralism selectively
with a close view to national economic security concerns. Maximizing economic
power thus forms the bedrock of neo-mercantilist geoeconomic strategies. Contrary
to a neo-imperialist strategy, which ultimately seeks political domination through
economic means, a neo-mercantilist strategy dictates avoiding costly political
commitments or a proactive regional political role, so as to be able to devote
maximum attention to national economic development.
In discussing Japan’s strategy of economic power maximization, Huntington (1993)
identified five main components of that strategy: (1) producer dominance—giving
priority to producer interests over consumer interests; (2) industry targeting—develop-
ing manufacturing capacities first for the home market and then for export markets,
with a particular focus on Bstrategic, high-technology, high-value added industries^
(p. 73); (3) expanding market shares—increasing the market shares of the country’s
corporations at the expense of profits, so a deliberate strategy of pursuing Brelative
gains in terms of market shares, rather than absolute gains in terms of profits^ (p. 74);
(4) import restriction—curbing imports and foreign direct investment; and (5) sustained
surplus—accumulating foreign exchange reserves through sustained trade surpluses
and by intervention in currency markets.12 Scholars have identified these same com-
ponents in the Chinese strategy of economic power maximization (e.g., Grosse 2014).
What all this amounts to is a confrontational approach to international relations. By
accumulating wealth, the state seeks to improve the relative position of the country’s
economy in the international hierarchy so as to enhance the state’s autonomy and
bargaining power in the international and regional arena.
Like Japan and China, Brazil also provides a case of a neo-mercantilist geoeco-
nomic strategy. A quest for autonomy, economic development, and improving
Brazil’s relative position in the global economy were the main drivers of its foreign
12 For a discussion of these components of neo-mercantilist geoeconomic strategy, see also Baru (2012).
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policy already during the Cold War (Hurrell 2013; Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006).
Burges (2012) also explains how Brazil follows a largely Bdistributive strategy^ as
a negotiator in regional and global fora, contrasting it with an Bintegrative
strategy^; i.e., it views international negotiations mainly as a zero-sum game.
The job of the negotiator therefore becomes one of maximizing the share of the
pie for Brazil’s own, relative benefit. Burges (2012, 2013) also explains how,
despite Brazil’s stated commitment to multilateralism, in reality that commitment
is thin and selective. Brazil has been reluctant to tie itself to regional institutions
and has carefully avoided becoming the paymaster for collective public goods to
the region. According to Gomes Saraiva (2010), Brazil views Bintegration as a way
of gaining access to foreign markets, strengthening the country’s bargaining posi-
tion in international economic negotiations, and projecting Brazilian industry in the
region^ (p. 154). According to many observers, Brazil has been too self-interested
and too focused on relative economic gains for it to be able to shoulder the
responsibilities that go with true regional leadership.13 As was explained above,
Brazil is a geopolitically satisfied country that wants to maximize its economic
power but that does not seek regional political domination.
Curiously, the five components of a neo-mercantilist strategy identified by
Huntington (1993) are also all present in Brazil’s external economic policy strat-
egy as practiced by the current Workers’ Party-led government. They are all
visible in the BNational Champions^ strategy, which aims to promote the interna-
tional competitiveness and internationalization of Brazilian corporations. As Abu-
El-Haj (2007) explains, Brazil has been building a neo-mercantilist development
approach involving Bnoninstitutional restrictions on imports using exchange rates,
regulation of financial flows, and active promotion of exports^ (p. 109). When it
comes to imports, Brazil is one of the most closed economies in the world (Canuto
et al. 2015). At the same time, the government has invested in the international-
ization of Brazilian corporations using subsidies channeled through the Brazil’s
state-run National Development Bank (BNDES) with the deliberate aim of gaining
market shares (see Flynn 2007). Brazil has a sustained trade surplus with all
countries in the South American region, save Bolivia, and it has been intervening
heavily in currency markets, most prominently when it unilaterally decided to
devalue its currency in 1999 in what practically amounted to a Bbeggar-thy-
neighbor^ policy against the other Mercosur member states (see Krapohl et al.
2014). In discussing Brazil’s neo-mercantilist strategy, Kröger (2012) shows how
the main aim has been to gain international security and power by maximizing
foreign exchange reserves.
Hegemonic geoeconomic strategies deploy economic power as a means to uphold
regional leadership, without habitually resorting to coercion. As opposed to neo-
imperialist strategies, hegemonic strategies are characterized by a higher degree of
self-restraint on the part of the regional power and Bsofter^ forms of domination by way
of cooperative institutional arrangements. 14 It may involve the provision of private
goods to neighboring states or regional public goods, on which other states in the
13 For a discussion of Brazil’s lack of regional leadership, see, e.g., Malamud and Rodriguez (2014).
14 For a discussion of Brestraint^ as a necessary component of a hegemonic strategy, see Ikenberry (2001). See
also Pedersen (2002) for his conceptualization of Bcooperative hegemony.^
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region will Bfree-ride^ and take advantage of without sharing the costs (Gilpin 1987;
Kindleberger 1986). A hegemonic geoeconomic strategy thus involves the regional
power bearing a disproportional share of the costs for public goods (Prys 2010).
Market-enhancing measures, including the provision of material benefits and rewards
to subordinate states, such as trade facilitation, economic assistance, and giving access
to the hegemon’s market, all belong to the toolkit of hegemonic strategies.15
The European Union (EU) operates a quintessential geoeconomic hegemony strat-
egy in its neighborhood. Without resorting to coercion, the EU uses its economic
domination to uphold hegemony in relation to its periphery. An important motivation is
to ensure the security of the continent. By relying on its formidable economic structure,
the EU attempts to export its policies to its neighbors—either in the form of enlarge-
ment or through policies and programs such as PHARE, TACIS, and CARD that are
designed to eventually bring the neighboring countries into the orbit of the EU (Le
Gloannec 2011, p. 103). Le Gloannec explains that BThe asymmetry between the
European Union and the candidate countries allows the former to exclusively set the
conditions. After all, it is the candidate country that suffers from exclusion, and it is the
candidate country that seeks entry; economic dominance and power of attraction—
asymmetry in short—play into the hands of the EU-ropeans for one main reason, and
that is, the professed desire of countries to join the EU…^ (2011, p. 105). While the
EU’s relationship with its periphery is deeply asymmetrical, with neighboring econo-
mies dependent on the Union’s internal market—so much so that Joffe (2007) speaks
about a Bhub and spoke^ system in which the core dominates the periphery—the EU
alone does not define this system. It is a result of an integration process through which
neighboring countries can take part in re-defining the core and become part of it
themselves. At the same time, it gives leaders of neighboring countries the chance to
free-ride on EU support, enabling, for instance, the Belorussian government to take EU
money while not adjusting to EU’s policies (Le Gloannec 2011). As such, it forms a
very different sort of geoeconomic strategy than that of neo-imperialism, which is less
able than hegemony to rely on the power of attraction and less open to a process
through which also the core becomes transformed.
Liberal institutionalist geoeconomic strategies are not deployed to pursue broader
geopolitical goals but foremost to pursue economic objectives as such. They denote an
economy-oriented notion of foreign policy idealism, as opposed to the realism of neo-
mercantilism, building on the belief that extending interdependence and economic
integration is a crucial imperative for all levels of security and prosperity. A liberal
institutionalist geoeconomic power is essentially a Bcivilian power^ that accepts the
necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of national objectives but that displays
an unwillingness of shouldering the broader burden and responsibility of being a
Bregional great power.^ Its national interest is defined foremost in economic terms,
through the joint pursuit of economic stability and growth in a liberal multilateral setting.
Germany provides a case of such a liberal institutionalist geoeconomic strategy.
Following World War II, West Germany dropped all pretensions for seeking hegemony
in Europe. It was happy to emerge as what former chancellor Helmut Schmidt
15 In a classic analysis, Keohane (1984, 45) explains how hegemony to a great part rests Bon the subjective
awareness by elites in secondary states that they are benefitting, as well as on the willingness of the hegemony
itself to sacrifice tangible short-term benefits for intangible long-term gains.^
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described as an economic giant but a political dwarf (cited in Szabo 2015, pp. 6–7).
Germany’s refusal to use its increasing economic power as a vehicle to develop its
broader geopolitical power base, shying away from political and military leadership,
precipitating talk about a Bleadership avoidance complex^ (see Miskimmon 2007, p.
24). Clearly, the German approach treated economic power as a goal in itself, not a
means to broader geopolitical aims. For the West German identity, the economic
miracle was its founding myth. It constituted, according to Müller (2005, pp. 144–
145), Ba modern equivalent to the Protestant ethic, which takes economic success as a
sign of salvation.^ As for the strategic frame of Germany, it has clearly been cooper-
ative, so much so that its foreign policy approach has been characterized as showing a
reflexive support for an Bexaggerated multilateralism^ (Anderson 1999). While some
observers see Germany’s actions during the European crisis as testimony of a changing
strategic frame towards a more competitive one, which would indicate a move from a
liberal institutionalist to a neo-mercantilist geoeconomic strategy, at least up until the
late 1990s, Germany remained committed to a firm policy of self-binding and integra-
tion into European institutions (Anderson 1999; Kudnani 2011; Mayer 2010; Szabo
2015). Indeed, up until recently, as Miskimmon (2007, p. 35) reiterates, BGermany has
seldom attempted to unilaterally affect the course of European integration.^
Two qualifying remarks have to be made. Firstly, the distinctions between neo-
imperialist, neo-mercantilist, hegemonic, and liberal institutionalist geoeconomic strat-
egies are ideal-typical in a Weberian sense (Table 1). It means that regional powers
should not be expected to always follow a Bpure^ neo-imperialist, neo-mercantilist,
hegemonic or liberal institutionalist strategy. As Destradi argues with reference to her
own ideal-typical categories, they Bact as a guideline for analysis, but what most
probably will be identified in empirical research are situations in which a particular
form of strategic orientation prevails.^ She continues that Bsince strategy is dynamic
and subject to learning processes, [we]…should assume that regional powers can
modify their strategies in the course of time, passing, for instance, from a [liberal
institutionalist to a neo-mercantilist or from a hegemonic to a neo-imperialist strategy]
in response to changed reactions by subordinate states, to domestic factors redefining
state priorities, or to pressures deriving from the external environment, for example,
from global powers^ (Destradi 2010, p. 929). Secondly, the fact that different strategies
may be used in different policy areas complicates matters, while it simultaneously
opens up additional avenues for making within-case comparisons and testing for
generalizability. For example, Russia’s strategy may look different depending on
whether the analysis looks at trade policy or energy policy. Empirical research should
test for such possible variations. Notwithstanding, from the perspective of economic
Table 1 Tactics and policies of regional powers’ geoeconomic strategies
Strategy Tactics and policies
Neo-imperialism Economic force, coercion, imposition, and bribery
Hegemony Provision of public and private goods
Neo-mercantilism Protectionism and selective multilateralism
Liberal institutionalism Economic integration and multilateralism
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power, policy areas are of course of different importance and therefore not equally
consequential. When evaluating geoeconomic strategies, one therefore needs to keep a
close eye on what aspect of economic power is the most important for the particular
regional power in question, e.g., energy in the case of Russia.
Conclusion: implications for geoeconomic research
Regional powers are increasingly important players in international politics. However,
they are so mainly as economic actors, projecting their power through external eco-
nomic policy. As a result, the concept of geoeconomics has become increasingly
important in both policy debates and academic studies on foreign policy and interna-
tional relations.
Yet, the geoeconomics research is still in its infancy. 16 Not only is there great
confusion over the concept of geoeconomics as such—indeed, it is often used without
much critical reflection as to what is actually meant with it and few studies have
attempted to explicitly define it—but no studies exist that would systematically com-
pare the geoeconomic activities of regional powers. Assuming also that the ways in
which these regional powers exercise their economic power have an influence on their
neighbors and regional developments, the lacuna of research on regional powers’
geoeconomics strategies is surprising.
The conceptual framework developed in this paper attempts to contribute to the
incipient geoeconomic research in several regards. Firstly, by defining geoeconomics as
the geostrategic use of economic power, it provides a much needed contribution to the
debate on what geoeconomics actually is. This definition captures the essence of what
most analysts refer to when speaking about geoeconomics as a foreign policy practice,
while being broad enough to include both liberal and realist approaches. Currently, few
attempts to define geoeconomics have been made and it has been used to denote
everything from a neo-liberal governance discourse (Sparke 2007) to economic nation-
alist practices (Tsygankov 2005) as well as to describe shifting trends in international
relations (Baracuhy 2013) or the notion that economic security concerns have eclipsed
military security concerns in the post-Cold War era (Hsiung 2009). Such conceptual
confusion exposes Bgeoeconomics^ to the risk of becoming an empty signifier. That
would be a shame since it clearly strikes a chord with some new trends in both foreign
policy practice and international relations analysis. What is needed, therefore, is to add
come clarity to the concept, and thus, more attempts to define it and make clear how the
different elements usually associated with geoeconomics relate to each other are surely
to be welcomed.
Secondly, the typology proposed in this paper provides for an analytically richer
device for comparing regional powers and their strategies than existing theory, which
assumes largely monolithic behavior among Bgeoeconomic powers.^ Currently, most
geoeconomic analyses expect regional powers to engage in what has been called
Bcommercial realism,^ closely related to what this paper has described as a neo-
mercantilist strategy (e.g., Kudnani 2011; Szabo 2015; see also Huntington 1993).
However, by reducing geoeconomic behavior to only denote neo-mercantilism, the
question about geoeconomic strategy is resolved by definitional fiat. It overlooks how
16 For a review, see Mattlin and Wigell (2015, this issue).
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economic power may be geostrategically used as a means to achieve a variety of goals
and through strategic frames other than an exclusively competitive one. Recently, more
liberal understandings of geoeconomics have been put forward that emphasize these
more cooperative dimensions. Indeed, reducing geoeconomics to commercial realism
restricts our understanding of these other geostrategic uses of economic power. This
paper therefore departs from a more eclectic approach to geoeconomics, which does not
a priori exclude either realism or liberalism. Instead, by using the combinatorial logic of
eclecticism, the paper constructs a typology that draws on the insights from both of
them and is thereby able to expand the analytical contrast space to include a broader
range of possible variation in geoeconomic strategy.
Thirdly, the ideal-typical taxonomy put forward here makes a useful distinction
between neo-imperialism and hegemony, concepts that are sometimes conflated and have
remained underspecified from a geoeconomics perspective. Here, a clear distinction is
made between the two concepts, with the term hegemony referring to more benevolent
leadership that includes the provision of collective goods, whereas neo-imperialism refers
to a mala fide, unilateral pursuit of national interest by the dominant power, sustained, if
necessary, by coercion, imposition or bribery, and the creation of dependent relations that
limit the sovereignty of neighboring states.17 I explicitly use the term neo-imperialism to
distinguish it frommore traditional, geopolitical uses of the notion of empire, which center
more exclusively around territorial annexation and control. Here, neo-imperialism is used
to connect with the idea of an Binformal empire^18 and the way relationships of economic
control and dependencies are used to reduce the effective sovereignty of neighboring
states without any need for de facto territorial control.
Lastly, the typology constructed in this paper not only allows us to analytically grasp
possible empirical variation in the geostrategic uses of economic power between
regional powers but it may also provide for an important variable when attempting to
explain different forms of regionalisms. If it is true that Bthe formative stage of regional
institutionalization is best studied by focusing upon the strategy of the biggest state in a
region^ (Pedersen 2002, p. 696); then, being able to distinguish between different
regional powers’ geoeconomic strategies is an important step. As such, the conceptual
framework suggested in this paper may serve as a possible basis not only for future
geoeconomic research but also more broadly for research concerning regional relations,
i.e., how a regional power’s geoeconomic strategy shapes the regional order.
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